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INTRODUCTION 
Pharmaceutical companies have been known to make moves that much of 
the general public may find questionable at best, reprehensible at worst.  The 
infamous case of Martin Shkreli, who earned the title of “most-hated man in 
America” after he was accused of serious price gouging on a life-saving 
medication, comes to mind.1  Beyond Shkreli, companies that produce opioids, 
which have been accused of worsening the opioid epidemic, have been indicted 
on criminal charges.2  However, despite this bad press, it has not deterred more 
poor decision-making from other pharmaceutical companies. 
Most recently,3 Allergan was taken to task after it transferred its patent for 
Restasis (an incredibly profitable drug for the company) to the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Indian Tribe (Regis Mohawk Tribe) in an attempt to avoid an inter 
 
1. Misyrlena Egkolfopoulou, Patricia Hurtado, and Chris Dolmetsch, Why “Pharma Bro” 
Martin Skreli is Swaggering Into Jail, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2017, 4:01 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-04/-pharma-bro-fall-why-most-hated-ceo-is-
swaggering-into-jail [https://perma.cc/RSW7-W3K5]. 
2. Samantha Raphelson, Alabama Targets OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma in Opioid Suit, 
NPR (Feb. 7, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/07/584034397/alabama-targets-
oxycontin-maker-purdue-pharma-in-opioid-suit [https://perma.cc/HK7W-UL2X]. 
3. Most recently at the time this article was written.  The author acknowledges that another 
pharmaceutical company may very well take it upon itself to try to one-up Allergan. 
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partes review (IPR) by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).4  According 
to Allergan’s press release, the Regis Mohawk Tribe would receive $13.75 
million upon execution of the agreement and $15 million each year in 
royalties.5  In return, the Regis Mohawk Tribe promised to not waive its 
sovereign immunity in any forthcoming IPR challenges, and Allergan would 
have an exclusive license to continue producing and profiting from Restasis.6  
The impact of shielding Restasis from any IPR challenges is two-fold: (1) other 
drug companies will have one less option for invalidating the patent, and (2) it 
opens up the market for generics.7 
Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe made this deal following the 
decision by the PTAB in Covidien LP v. University of Florida Research 
Foundation (“Covidien”) in early 2017 that held that state entities are protected 
from IPR due to their sovereign immunity.8  Presumably, Allergan assumed 
that the sovereign immunity rights given to state entities would extend to tribal 
sovereign immunity.  Allergan’s conclusion that it could contract with a tribe 
to essentially purchase its immunity has been questioned by other courts.  For 
example, in Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the court had to 
consider whether to join the Regis Mohawk Tribe to a patent infringement suit 
between Allergan, the plaintiff, and competitor TEVA, the defendant.9  The 
court questioned the validity of Allergan’s arrangement with the Regis 
Mohawk Tribe on multiple grounds, including questioning whether there was 
a valid contract between Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe or if the transfer 
was a sham and the contract was void due to lack of valid consideration.10  The 
 
4. Press Release, Allergan, Allergan and Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Announce Agreements 
Regarding RESTASIS® Patents (Sep. 8, 2017) (published on Allergan’s website).  The inter partes 
review process is a point of contention for drug companies.  See Eric Sagonowsky, In a blow for 
pharma, Supreme Court upholds the hated IPR patent challenge, FiercePharma (Apr. 24, 2018, 4:35 
PM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/iprs-hated-by-branded-drugmakers-deemed-
constitutional-at-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/FME8-L6QW]. Pharmaceutical companies contend 
that the IPR process allows for unnecessary increases in the amount of litigation they have to defend 
against.  Id.  Competing drug companies still have other routes for invalidating the patent in federal 
court.  Id.  However, the IPR process is quicker with a higher success rate.  Over fifty percent of patents 
challenged before the PTAB are invalidated.  Orlando Lopez, Inter Partes Review: After Five Years, 
What Will 2018 Bring?, Burns Levinson (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/inter-
partes-review-after-five-years-92507/ [https://perma.cc/7NXD-K76F]. 
5. Press Release, Allergan, supra note 4.   
6. Id. 
7. Currently, the two main process available are the inter partes review process and actions 
available through the Hatch-Waxman Act.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
8. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Nos. IPR2016-01274, IPR2016-01275, 
IPR2016-01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). 
9. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at 
*1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017). 
10. Id. at *3. 
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court ultimately did not have to decide this issue, leaving it for the PTAB to 
determine at a later date.11   
The PTAB recognized the doctrine of tribal immunity but considered a line 
of cases that indicated that Congress could impliedly abrogate immunity when 
a statute is of general applicability.12  The PTAB concluded that the IPR 
proceedings were based on statutes of general applicability, which impliedly 
abrogates the Regis Mohawk Tribe’s immunity as a defense in IPR 
proceedings.13  On appeal, the Federal Circuit ignored the PTAB’s reasoning 
and determined that agency proceedings by the Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) are akin to actions by the federal government, and no immunity is 
allowed as a defense.14 
This Comment will address two primary issues.  First, it will analyze the 
basis of sovereign immunity rights of tribes, with a focus on the relationship 
between intellectual property rights and sovereignty.  Second, it will discuss 
whether this arrangement violates the antitrust laws of the United States.  This 
Comment concludes that even if a claim of tribal sovereign immunity is 
legitimate, it is likely that such an arrangement still violates the relevant 
antitrust claims. 
I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The foundation of any tribal sovereignty analysis begins with the 
Constitution, which states that Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes.”15  Conflict between the tribes and the United States has been 
around for longer than the nation has actually been a nation.16  Thus, trying to 
navigate the extent of the relationship between our nation and the tribal nations 
has been going on for over two hundred years: initially in treaties and later in 
congressional acts.17  Congress’ right to regulate the tribes was described in 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.18  The Court stated, “plenary authority over the tribal 
 
11. Id. at *4. 
12. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128, 
IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4–6 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).   
13. Id. at *7. 
14. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   
16. Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under 
Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American 
Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 683–84 (2002). 
17. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).   
18. Id. at 565.   
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relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the 
beginning . . . .”19   
The foundational cases establishing a general concept of tribal sovereign 
immunity were decided in the early 1800s, and taken together, they are referred 
to as “The Marshall Trilogy.”20  The first of these cases, Johnson v. M’Intosh, 
established that the tribes possessed lesser rights than the complete federal 
sovereignty of the United States.21  Tribal sovereigns enjoyed sovereignty 
rights accorded to “independent nations” insofar as they had the right to occupy 
their lands and “use it according to their own discretion,” but the official title 
to the land belonged to the government of the United States.22 
The second case in the trilogy is Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.23  In 
Cherokee Nation, the state of Georgia sought to seize the lands of the Cherokee 
Nation and enforce certain laws against the Tribe.24  The Cherokees sued in the 
Supreme Court, arguing that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over 
controversies arising between states and foreign states.25  The Court rejected 
the Cherokee Nation’s argument that they were a foreign state.26  Rather, the 
Court contended that there was a “peculiar” relationship between the United 
States and the tribes that was unlike anything else in existence.27  The tribes 
relied on the U.S. government for protection and trade, and they were granted 
some representation in Congress when deemed appropriate.28  Because of this 
unique relationship, the Cherokee Nation could not be considered a foreign 
nation as it was meant by the Constitution.29  Rather, the tribes were more 
appropriately designated “domestic dependent nations” because the United 
States was essentially their guardian while the tribal nations were merely the 
United States’ wards.30 
The last case in the trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia, came about after Georgia 
again attempted to enforce its laws against a member of the Cherokee Nation.31  
However, the Court found that the Cherokee Nation was “a distinct community 
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the 
 
19. Id. 
20. Seielstad, supra note 16, at 686. 
21. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823). 
22. Id. 
23. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
24. Id. at 15. 
25. Id. at 16. 
26. Id. at 19–20. 
27. Id. at 16.   
28. Id. at 17.   
29. Id. at 19–20. 
30. Id. at 17. 
31. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 537–38 (1832). 
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laws of Georgia can have no force.”32  The regulation of the Cherokee Nation 
was “committed exclusively to the government of the union.”33  Therefore, only 
the federal government could exercise any power over a tribe, and the state in 
which the tribe resided had no regulatory authority. 
Based on this initial framework set forth by these earlier cases, the Court in 
Turner v. United States, declared that “the Creek Nation was free from liability 
for injuries to persons or property due to mob violence or failure to keep the 
peace” after tribal members destroyed the fence of a neighboring property.34  
No liability could exist against the Tribe without authorization from Congress 
or consent from the Tribe because the Creek Nation was “a distinct political 
community.”35  However, the Court at the time declined to adopt a full 
sovereign immunity doctrine, stating that “[t]he fundamental obstacle to 
recovery is not the immunity of a sovereign to suit, but the lack of a substantive 
right to recover the damages resulting from failure of a government or its 
officers to keep the peace.”36 
Finally, the Supreme Court, resting on its holding in Turnery, talked 
explicitly of the immunity of tribal nations for the first time in 1940.37  The 
Court held that the tribes possessed an immunity from any direct suit or cross 
suit absent Congressional authorization.38  The Court reaffirmed the tribal 
sovereign immunity doctrine in 1977 stating that “[a]bsent an effective waiver 
or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a 
recognized Indian tribe.”39   
Despite this seemingly settled doctrine, the Supreme Court has called into 
question the continuation of this policy.40  The Court in Kiowa Tribe of 
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. expressed that perhaps Turner 
was never intended to be the basis for a doctrine of tribal immunity, and the 
doctrine only evolved because later courts kept citing to it with little analysis.41  
The Court criticized the continuance of the doctrine, arguing that its relevance 
in the modern world was questionable.42  Nevertheless, the Court upheld the 
 
32. Id. at 561.   
33. Id. 
34. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357–58 (1919). 
35. Id. at 357–59. 
36. Id. at 358. 
37. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).   
38. Id. at 512–13.   
39. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977). 
40. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998).   
41. Id.   
42. Id. at 757–58.   
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doctrine.43  The Court recognized Congress’ right to regulate tribal policy and 
deferred to Congress to make any changes to the currently standing doctrine.44  
However, acts of Congress since Kiowa have done little to disturb the tribal 
immunity doctrine.45 
This tribal sovereign immunity is different from what is enjoyed by the 
states, which are granted their immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.46  
While both tribal nations and states are generally immune from suit by private 
parties, two key distinctions exist.  First, individuals can sue tribes in a broader 
range of circumstances because tribes can have their immunity abrogated by 
Congress whereas states generally cannot.47  Indeed, there are only two 
circumstances that allow an individual to sue a state:48  “Congress may 
authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment [or] a State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to 
suit.”49  Second, tribes are immune from suit by states, whereas states are not 
immune from suit by sister states.50   
What makes the States’ surrender of immunity from suit by sister States 
plausible is the mutuality of that concession.  There is no such mutuality with 
either foreign sovereigns or Indian tribes . . . as it would be absurd to suggest 
that the tribes surrendered immunity in a convention to which they were not 
even parties.51 
This difference between the two entities can perhaps explain the different 
outcomes tribes and states have had at the PTAB when trying to use a sovereign 
immunity argument. 
 
43. Id. at 759.   
44. Id.  As suggested by one author, the Court at the time knew that Congress was in the process 
of reconsidering the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine and may have ruled as it did thinking Congress 
would remedy the situation on its own.  Seielstad, supra note 16, at 665–66. 
45. See e.g., Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-179, 114 Stat. 46 (2000).  This legislation increased the clarity with which contracts 
with tribes must be made to avoid issues with sovereign immunity upon a breach of the agreement.  
See id. 
46. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or 
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI.   
47. See e.g., discussion infra Part III. 
48. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 
(1999). 
49. Id. 
50. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak and Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991). 
51. Id. (explaining that the tribes never surrendered their immunity from suit because they were 
not present at the Constitutional Convention). 
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II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
As previously established, tribal sovereign immunity can only be abrogated 
by Congress or through an express waiver by the tribe.52  There are quite a few 
areas where Congress has used its authority to limit tribal immunity (e.g., 
murder, kidnapping, arson),53 but intellectual property is not one of them.   
However, Congress did pass two acts attempting to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity with respect to patents and trademarks: the Trademark Remedy 
Clarification Act of 1992 (TRCA)54 and the Patent and Plant Variety Protection 
Remedy Clarification Act (PRCA).55  Prior to the TRCA, individuals did not 
have a private right of action against a state that misrepresented its product in 
violation of section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946.56  By enacting the 
TRCA, Congress intended to extend the phrase “[a]ny person” in section 43(a) 
to include state entities, thus abrogating the immunity of the states with regard 
to trademark infringement.57  Similarly, the PRCA was enacted to abrogate state 
immunity with regard to patent infringement.58  In two sister cases, the Supreme 
Court addressed the validity of these acts after a claim that a Florida state entity 
falsely represented its product in violation of section 4359 and infringed on 
College Savings Bank’s patent.60  In both of these instances, the Court held that 
Congress did not have the power to abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity.61  
These cases seemed to suggest that where intellectual property rights had been 
infringed, sovereign immunity would prevail. 
Even more recently, in Covidien, the PTAB held that state entities were 
protected from IPR due to their state sovereign immunity.62  Covidien filed 
 
52. See discussion supra Part II. 
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012). 
54. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992). 
55. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 
Stat. 4230 (1992). 
56. “Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), enacted in 1946, created a private 
cause of action against ‘[a]ny person’ who uses false descriptions or makes false representations in 
commerce.”  Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 
(1999). 
57. Id. 
58. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 
(1999). 
59. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 671 
(1999). 
60. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 630. 
61. Id. at 647; Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 691. 
62. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Nos. IPR2016-01274, IPR2016-01275, 
IPR2016-01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).  It should, however, be noted that 
future PTAB decisions are typically not bound by stare decisis in the same manner as the judiciary 
branch of the government.  PTAB’s Designations for Opinions, USPTO (Jan. 12, 2016), 
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petitions requesting IPR on patents held by the University of Florida Research 
Foundation (UFRF).63  The UFRF filed a motion to dismiss, alleging its 
sovereign immunity was a defense to the IPR petition.  The PTAB held that the 
Eleventh Amendment “limit[ed] not only the judicial authority of the federal 
courts to subject a state to an unconsented suit, but also preclude[d] certain 
adjudicative administrative proceedings.”64  The holding in Covidien applied 
not only to the state of Florida proper but also extended to any state agents or 
instrumentalities, which included the University of Florida’s research 
foundation.65 
To come to this conclusion, the PTAB focused on the Supreme Court case, 
Federal Maritime Communication v. South Carolina State Ports Authority 
(FMC), which was a Supreme Court case that considered whether state 
sovereign immunity precluded the  
FMC from “adjudicating a private party’s complaint that a state-run port ha[d] 
violated the Shipping Act of 1984.”66  The Court held that the similarities 
between agency adjudications bared such strong similarities to civil litigation 
that the states could not be subjected to such proceedings due to their state 
sovereignty.67  The PTAB held that proceedings before the PTO were much 
like the adjudications considered in FMC, and therefore, the state had a 
sovereign immunity defense against any IPR.68 
It seems that Allergan was emboldened by the PTAB’s decision in Covidien 
because less than a year after that decision came out, Allergan put out its press 
release announcing the transfer of its patent to the Regis Mohawk Tribe.69  This 
may have been a gamble that was not worth its initial $13.75 million price tag 
(not to mention the additional $15 million per year in royalties)70 because the 
PTAB rejected the Regis Mohawk Tribe’s argument that tribal sovereign 
 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/PTAB%20Designations%20for%20Opinions%2
01-12-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/GFN4-S6MA].  This lack of consistency when issuing opinions is 
another source of frustration between industry professionals and the PTAB—without stare decisis, 
practitioners are left guessing about what the outcome will be at the PTAB.  See e.g., Kate Gaudry & 
Thomas Franklin, Only 1 in 20,631 ex parte appeals designated precedential by PTAB, 
IPWATCHDOG (Sep. 27, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/09/27/only-1-in-20631-ex-parte-
appeals-designated-precedential-by-ptab/id=61999/ [https://perma.cc/57QE-NGMK].  The title refers 
to ex parte appeals, but most PTAB decisions are designated as “routine” and therefore non-
precedential.  PTAB’s Designations for Opinions, supra. 
63. Covidien LP, WL 4015009 at *1. 
64. Id. at *2. 
65. Id. at *12. 
66. Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002). 
67. Id. at 760. 
68. Covidien LP, WL 4015009 at *8. 
69. Press Release, Allergan, supra note 4.   
70. Id. 
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immunity applied to the inter partes review proceedings and declared that 
Allergan was still the owner for purposes of the proceedings.71  In coming to 
this decision, the PTAB recognized that a tribe was a “‘domestic dependent 
nation[]’ that exercise[s] ‘inherent sovereign authority’” and that a tribe can 
only be subjected to suit when explicitly authorized by Congress or when 
immunity has been waived by the tribe.72  However, despite a lack of express 
abrogation by Congress or waiver by the Regis Mohawk Tribe, the PTAB held 
that tribal sovereign immunity did not apply in the same manner as state 
sovereign immunity.73   
While recognizing the doctrine of tribal immunity, the PTAB considered a 
line of cases that indicated that Congress could impliedly abrogate immunity 
when a statute was of general applicability.  The Supreme Court held in Federal 
Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, that “a general statute in terms 
applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests.”74  The 
Court further noted that acts of general applicability will apply to tribes unless 
there is “a clear expression [of Congress] to the contrary.”75  This case looked 
at whether licensees of the Federal Power Commission had the authority to 
“take lands owned by Indians, as well as those of all other citizens, when needed 
for a licensed project, upon the payment of just compensation.”76  While the 
Supreme Court appeared to only hold with reference to actual property rights, 
the PTAB took this ruling, applied it to intellectual property rights,77 and held 
that the Patent Act was a general act with which the tribe was required to 
comply.78   
 
71. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128, 
IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).  The PTAB reiterated the doubt expressed in Kiowa to help justify its 
decision to deny the tribal immunity.  Id. at *4. 
72. Id. at *3. 
73. Id. at *4–6. 
74. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960). 
75. Id. at 120. 
76. Id. at 123. 
77. Actual property rights and intellectual property rights are not exactly analogous bodies of 
law.  See e.g., Andrew Lee, Intellectual Property, Moral Rights, and Social Utility: A Classically 
Liberal Exploration of the Normative and Practical Implications of Intellectual Property Rights, 7 
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 431, 432-33 (2013) (“The protection of intellectual property creates interesting 
problems for scholars and lawmakers who, despite their devotion to the preservation of physical 
property rights, nonetheless feel that intellectual property rights represent a set of concerns and 
principles that can be quite distinct from those evoked by ownership of a plot of land or a bag of 
gold.”). 
78. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128, 
IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4–6 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018). 
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A prominent case extending the holding of Federal Power Commission 
beyond property rights is Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm.79  In this 
case, an Occupational Safety and Health Administrator (OSHA) compliance 
officer found twenty-one health and safety violations at the Coeur d’Alene 
Tribal Farm, which was wholly owned and operated by the Coeur d’Alene 
Indian Tribe.80  The Tribe did not argue the validity of the violations but instead 
argued that they had tribal immunity from any liability under the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act.81  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Congress 
limited the Tribe’s immunity when it created this Act because it was of general 
applicability to all “employers.”82  The court noted three exceptions to this rule 
that general acts should apply to tribes equally as to any other body: 
 
(1) the law touches ‘exclusive rights of self-governance in purely 
intramural matters’; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would 
‘abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties’; or (3) there is proof ‘by 
legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the 
law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations.83 
 
This reasoning has been applied with mixed results in different circuits.84 
The PTAB’s decision that patent laws are generally applicable, and thus 
abrogate the tribe’s sovereign immunity, is not entirely novel.  However, this 
argument has not been addressed in a patent law context by the Supreme Court, 
and the lower courts that have heard such claims have typically found the 
argument lacking.  For example, in Microlog Corp. v. Continental Airlines, 
Inc., the court held that “[t]he Patent Act, though authorizing civil actions for 
infringement, does not unequivocally abrogate an Indian Tribe’s immunity 
from suit for patent infringement.”85  The court in Specialty House of Creation, 
Inc. v. Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma took the analysis one step further and argued 
 
79. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). 
80. Id. at 1114. 
81. Id. at 1115. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1116 (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893–94 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
84. See e.g., Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 711–12 (10th Cir. 1982) 
(holding that OSHA did not apply to the Navajo Tribe because it violated treaty rights to exclude non-
Indians from tribal property, interfered with tribal sovereignty and self-government, and the general 
applicability language was not strong enough to abrogate rights granted by treaties); EEOC v. 
Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937 (10th. Cir. 1989) (holding that the EEOC did not have authority over 
the Cherokee Nation because the Tribe had a “treaty-protected right of self-government,” and the 
statute did not expressly abrogate the treaty rights). 
85. Microlog Corp. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. 6:10-CV-260, 2011 WL 13141413, at *2 (E.D. 
Tex. Jul. 22, 2011).   
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that the fact that Congress did not include tribes as possible infringing parties 
in the PRCA “[d]espite providing specifically for waiver of state sovereign 
immunity” demonstrated that Congress had not unequivocally waived any 
tribal sovereign immunity.86 
The Regis Mohawk Tribe was also unsuccessful on appeal to the Federal 
Circuit, although the Federal Circuit did not directly address the PTAB’s 
“implied abrogation” argument.87  Rather, the court used a similar analysis to 
the one used by the PTAB in Covidien, which looked at the Supreme Court’s 
decision in FMC.  However, the Federal Circuit came to the opposite 
conclusion that the PTAB came to in Covidien.  In FMC, the Supreme Court 
held that immunity exists where adjudication proceedings are brought against 
a state by a private party, and there is no immunity where proceedings are an 
agency-initiated enforcement proceeding.88  In its review, the Federal Circuit 
determined that the IPR system is a hybrid of these two proceedings, but there 
were several factors that made the court decide that IPR “is more like an agency 
enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a private party.”89  Namely, the 
USPTO Director (rather than a private party) had broad discretion in instituting 
reviews, the PTAB could continue its review even if the private party petitioner 
decided not to participate, the USPTO proceedings did not mirror Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which would suggest a civil proceeding, and the USPTO’s 
authority was often more inquisitorial than adjudicatory.90  The court concluded 
that because the IPR system is more like an agency enforcement action than a 
civil suit, sovereign immunity was not available as a defense to IPR.91 
The Federal Circuit’s opinion is confusing for a few reasons.  First, the 
court ignored the fact that the PTAB had reached an opposite conclusion in 
Covidien and made no attempt to clarify how the two cases were 
distinguishable.  Similarly, the court failed to address the PTAB’s implied 
abrogation theory or any other prior case law that established guidelines for 
when to give tribes immunity in federal proceedings.  It is also unclear why the 
court decided to use a case that discussed state immunity rather than one of the 
 
86. Specialty House of Creation, Inc. v. Quapaw Tribe of Okla., No. 10-CV-371-GKF-TLW, 
2011 WL 308903, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 27, 2011).  The Second Circuit also conducted a similar 
analysis when analyzing a copyright infringement case against the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe.  Bassett 
v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2000).  The court held that the Tribe enjoyed 
immunity from copyright infringement claims because the Copyright Act does not expressly abrogate 
tribal immunity.  Further stating, “the fact that a statute applies to Indian tribes does not mean that 
Congress abrogated tribal immunity in adopting it.”  Id. at 357. 
87. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
88. Id. at 1327. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 1328–29. 
91. Id. at 1327. 
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many existing approaches for tribal immunity.92  With its opinion, the court 
added another layer of confusion to the tribal sovereignty doctrine.   
III. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF 
DETERRENCE 
Eliminating or limiting tribal immunity does not seem to be the correct 
approach for handling a case such as this.  As previously noted, tribal sovereign 
immunity developed to atone for depriving tribes of their rights for years.  
Cutting these rights down as a snap reaction to what is admittedly an 
unscrupulous arrangement between Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe 
punishes all tribes for the actions of one.  A more appropriate way to invalidate 
this arrangement would be to invalidate it under antitrust laws, thus leaving 
tribal rights intact. 
A patent-owner essentially has a government-sanctioned monopoly over its 
product for the life of the patent.93  The importance of stimulating discovery 
and invention was recognized by the Constitution, which granted Congress the 
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”94  This is exemplified under section 154 of the 
Patent Act, which states that a patent-holder has “the right to exclude others 
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States or importing the invention into the United States” for a period of 
twenty years from the date of filing the application.95  As part of the system that 
grants these monopolies, the government has set up certain systems to regulate, 
including the IPR system through the PTAB. 
Despite the fact that the granting of a patent establishes what is essentially 
a monopoly, patent-holders still must strike a balance between their patent-
monopoly and any applicable antitrust laws.96  Under the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine, a private party is typically immune from antitrust liability when the 
party is seeking to influence government action, even where that action would 
hinder competition.97  This doctrine attempts to strike a balance between 
 
92. Even more confounding, the court indicated that even though it used a case on state 
sovereign immunity to decide this case on tribal sovereign immunity, this holding would not 
necessarily apply to a state challenge under the same circumstances.  Id. at 1329. 
93. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013). 
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
95. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
96. GLEN P. BELVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: PROTECTING 
THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE § 6.07 (Law Journal Press 2018). 
97. Enforcement Perspectives on the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, FTC STAFF REPORT 1 
(2006), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ftc-staff-report-concerning-
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encouraging competition while not impinging on a party’s freedom of speech.98  
When a party seeks to enforce its intellectual property rights in court, it is 
seeking redress from the government and would fall under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.  Thus, typically under this doctrine, Allergan’s 
infringement suit against Teva would be immune from antitrust allegations. 
However, there are several exceptions to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.  
Most notably in this case, the immunity provided by the doctrine is lost when a 
party uses sham litigation to enforce intellectual property rights in court.99  A 
sham litigation occurs when the lawsuit is objectively baseless and when the 
litigant’s subjective motivation is to interfere with the business of a competitor 
through the use of the governmental process.100  A lawsuit is objectively 
baseless when “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect to succeed on 
the merits of the suit.”101  A litigant’s subjective motivation is suspect when the 
“baseless lawsuit was an attempt to use the litigation process—as opposed to 
the outcome of the litigation—as an anticompetitive weapon.”102   
The subjective motivation in this case helps to illuminate whether the 
lawsuit was objectively baseless.  While subjective motivation may be hard to 
prove, Allergan has made its motivation abundantly clear: it feared a losing 
case and arranged a deal with the Regis Mohawk Tribe as means to outsmart 
the system.  Presumably, Allergan would not have made any arrangement with 
the Regis Mohawk Tribe if it believed that it was going to win on the merits of 
its infringement case, thus suggesting an objectively baseless lawsuit.  Allergan 
weaponized the Regis Mohawk Tribe’s immunity to give itself an 
anticompetitive edge.  Because the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunity would 
likely fail, Allergan should have to answer to the antitrust implications of its 
actions in addition to the IPR. 
If the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunity is lost, then the Sherman Act 
may apply.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, “Every contract . . . or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is 
hereby declared to be illegal.”103  Section 2 of the Sherman Act states, “Every 





99. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). 
100. Mark L. Kovner et al., Applying the Noerr Doctrine to Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 609, 619 (2003). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
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with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”104   
There are two types of analysis that courts use to assess if a party has 
operated in violation of the Sherman Act.  The evaluating body will either use 
a per se analysis or a rule of reason analysis.105  A per se analysis is used where 
a restraint on trade is “so plainly anticompetitive” that there is no need for “an 
elaborate inquiry into the restraint’s likely competitive effect.”106  This is 
generally reserved for situations such as “naked price-fixing, output restraints, 
and market division among horizontal competitors, as well as certain group 
boycotts.”107  Most challenges in intellectual property will require a rule of 
reason analysis.108  This requires an assessment of “whether the restraint is 
likely to have anticompetitive effect and, if so, whether the restraint is 
reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that outweigh those 
anticompetitive effects.”109 
However, patents present a unique challenge to an antitrust analysis 
because “[b]y their nature, patents create an environment of exclusion, and 
consequently, cripple competition.”110  This analysis issue has arisen in another 
type of pharmaceutical arrangement that has drawn criticism as a violation of 
the Sherman Act: “reverse payment” settlements aka “pay-to-delay” 
schemes.111  The issues with this type of arrangement was well-described by 
the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actatvis, Inc.112  The Court explained: 
 
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement.  The two 
companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed 
infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent’s term 
expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of 
 
104. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
105. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, U.S. DOJ AND FTC 16–17 
(Jan. 12, 2017) 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1049793/ip_guidelines_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U8Z4-RB8R]. 
106. Id. at 17. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 16. 
109. Id. at 17. 
110. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065–66 (11th Cir. 2005). 
111. See e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining 
that in “pay for delay” or “reverse payment” arrangements, “a patent holder pays the allegedly 
infringing generic drug company to delay entering the market until a specified date, thereby protecting 
the patent monopoly against a judgment that the patent is invalid or would not be infringed by the 
generic competitor”). 
112. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (minority held that “[a] patent carves out an 
exception to the applicability of antitrust laws.”) 
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dollars.  Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged 
infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement is 
often called a “reverse payment” settlement agreement.113 
 
In FTC, the Court noted that this arrangement occurs mostly “in the context 
of pharmaceutical drug regulation, and specifically in the context of suits 
brought under statutory provisions allowing a generic drug manufacturer . . . to 
challenge the validity of a patent owned by an already-approved brand-name 
drug owner.”114 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard FTC v. Actavis prior 
to the Supreme Court, held that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining 
the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long 
as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential 
of the patent.”115  This holding essentially protected reverse payments from 
antitrust challenges.  However, on appeal, the Supreme Court rejected that idea 
because the Sherman Act “imposes strict limitations on the concerted activities 
in which patent owners may lawfully emerge,”116 and these arrangements have 
the “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”117 
The Court concluded that the rule of reason analysis that applies to any 
other type of antitrust litigation must also apply when assessing an arrangement 
where one party is a patent-holder.118  It also noted that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
itself, which was clearly procompetitive, ran contrary to the Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that reverse payment schemes should be immune from antitrust 
attack.119  The Court remanded for further proceedings but suggested some 
areas where the lower court might find anticompetitive effects as part of its 
analysis.120  The Court noted that only valid patents had a right to exclude others 
from use; “an invalidated patent carries with it no such right.”121  However, if 
the reverse payment scheme is allowed to stand without further analysis, it is 
possible that the patent-monopoly will be allowed to continue, at the expense 
of the consumer, even though the patent may in fact be invalid.122  Also, the 
 
113. Id. at 2227. 
114. Id. 
115. FTC v. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312. 
116. FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2232 (quoting United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 
174, 197 (1963)). 
117. Id. at 2234 (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986)). 
118. Id. at 2236. 
119. Id. at 2234. 
120. Id. at 2234–38. 
121. Id. at 2231 (emphasis in original). 
122. Id. at 2234. 
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Court questioned whether a large reverse payment might demonstrate that the 
patentee was charging prices that were “higher than the competitive level,” 
referring to the FTC’s claim that “reverse payment agreements are associated 
with the presence of higher-than-competitive profits.”123  The Court 
acknowledged that the patentee may be able to justify the large reverse 
payment, making it a permissible settlement agreement, but there was no 
immunity preempting the parties from having to demonstrate this kind of 
analysis.124 
While looking at settlement arrangements between brand-named patent-
holders and generic-brand would-be competitors is not an exact equivalent to 
the arrangement between Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe, the Court’s 
logic still seems very applicable.  Despite the fact that Allergan had a patent 
that it would normally be free to assign or use in any other manner it found 
suitable, the patent should not provide complete immunity because the Sherman 
Act “imposes strict limitations on the concerted activities in which patent 
owners may lawfully engage.”125  Thus, it must be determined if the 
arrangement between Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe, “is likely to have 
anticompetitive effect and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably necessary 
to achieve procompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects” 
using a rule of reason analysis.126 
The anticompetitive effects seem obvious and significant.  Allergan has not 
tried to cover up the fact that the sole reason for the arrangement with the Regis 
Mohawk Tribe was to avoid having its patent invalidated, which would permit 
generic drug manufacturers to enter the market.  These actions were intended 
to prolong the patent-monopoly beyond what might have been otherwise 
allowable—this is the epitome of an anticompetitive arrangement. 
Also, as suggested by the Court in FTC, an invalid patent has no right to 
any patent protection.  By circumventing the system that seeks to determine the 
validity of the patent, a patent-monopoly may be extended to a product that is 
not actually deserving of such protection.  The possibility that an invalid patent 
for the brand-name drug is allowed to stand and continue to exclude generics 
from entering the market is plainly anticompetitive. 
Finally, the Court in FTC questioned whether the presence of a large 
reverse payment demonstrated that the patentee was charging prices that were 
“higher-than-competitive.”  A similar question could be asked of Allergan’s 
drug pricing given that it was willing and able to pay the Regis Mohawk Tribe 
 
123. Id. at 2236. 
124. Id. at 2237. 
125. Id. at 2232 (quoting United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 197 (1963)). 
126. See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, supra note 105, at 17. 
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a substantial sum of money to take over its patent.  If no legitimate explanation 
can be offered by Allergan, it is possible that this “sale” might be demonstrative 
of a severe anticompetitive effect. 
The procompetitive benefits are less obvious, but they do exist.  Typically, 
licensing agreements are favored because they tend to allow more people access 
to the patent.127  Furthermore, the Native American population is a group that 
has historically faced discrimination and disenfranchisement.128  The Regis 
Mohawk Tribe has retained rights in this agreement to “practice the patents for 
research, education, and other non-commercial uses.”129  Theoretically, if the 
Regis Mohawk Tribe took advantage of these rights, the Regis Mohawk Tribe 
could have an opportunity to gain valuable experience and become a 
competitive player in the market.  These potential benefits could be a serious 
benefit to the Regis Mohawk Tribe, but there is nothing that indicates the Regis 
Mohawk Tribe has any intention to take advantage of them.   
The anticompetitive effects are clearly unreasonable, even considering any 
possible procompetitive benefits.  They run counter to the purpose of two large 
acts of Congress that attempted to curb such effects.  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
was clearly intended to allow generics to enter the market sooner, and the inter 
partes review proceedings function to invalidate patents in an expedient 
manner.  The arrangement between Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe was 
an attempt to dodge these restraints that Congress enacted upon the patent-
monopoly. 
Despite the analysis weighing towards a violation of the Sherman Act, there 
is of course still a question of whether the Regis Mohawk Tribe would attempt 
to shield itself behind its tribal sovereign immunity.  Given the perceived 
egregiousness of this arrangement, it seems very possible that (if this were to 
reach the Supreme Court), the Court would use this occasion to act on the 
doubts it expressed in Kiowa about the continued benefit of tribal immunity in 
a modern world.  Even if the Regis Mohawk Tribe were found to be protected, 
Allergan would have no such protection and could still be held responsible for 
its actions.  The punishment of the one party would still be enough to deter any 
similar arrangements in the future. 
 
127. Id. at 5–7. 
128. See e.g., Jeremiah A. Bryar, What Goes Around, Comes Around: How Indian Tribes Can 
Profit in the Aftermath of Seminole Tribe and Florida Prepaid, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 229, 
230 (2009).  This article suggests that the creation of “sovereign chartered research groups [would] 
drive additional funding into the tribes, create jobs for tribal members, and bring hope into the lives of 
a people who desperately need it.”  Id. at 248. 
129. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at 
*15 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017). 
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CONCLUSION 
Congress could address these issues to prevent any such instances in the 
future.  The case law is clear: Congress can abrogate the tribal immunity with 
respect to patent (and other intellectual property law)—it just has to do so in a 
manner that is unequivocal.  Perhaps taking such actions would prevent similar 
unscrupulous business decisions in the future.  If Congress has purposefully not 
abrogated tribal immunity with respect to intellectual property law for whatever 
reason,130 it could also stipulate that tribal immunity applies where the tribe was 
the inventor or rightfully obtained rights to a patent (i.e., through purchasing 
the rights; not for being paid to hold onto the rights).  But “sovereign immunity 
should not be treated as a monetizable commodity that can be purchased by 
private entities as part of a scheme to evade their legal responsibilities.”131  In 
the absence of such Congressional action, this arrangement should be 
recognized for what it is: an attempt to bypass current patent laws at the expense 
of the public that depends on critical drugs and a violation of U.S. antitrust law.   
 
 
130. And there are legitimate reasons.  American tribal relations are notably tainted by a sordid 
past, and there are situations where sovereign immunity is an important right.  However, one could 
hardly argue that the intention behind creating a tribal immunity policy was to grant tribes the right to 
collude with powerful industry players to circumvent antitrust laws.   
131. Allergan, Inc., 2017 WL 4619790 at *12. 
